IN OUR
TIMES SERIES
As one of its projects, the
OKSPN (Overseas Korean Senior Professionals Network) has launched
an essay project titled IN OUR TIMES. It represents
unique Korean-American experience and
perspective shared by many members of OKSPN, most of whom
have lived almost a half century
in America since their arrival here, starting from the end
of the Korean War. As to "What and
Why" of OKSPN, they are explained in the SKAS homepage (www.skas.org)
under the
heading of OKSPN.
Contributions from its members will be posted in this OKSPN
Forum. We will follow a format
similar to book jackets - About the Author, Author's photo,
and the essay. This is a project
in progress, an open-ended one. Any member of OKSPN,
when their spirit moves them,
can contribute with a view toward enhancing the Korean-American
experience and hence
provide insights gained from their experiences to all those
who followed and will follow us
in the future.
IN OUR TIMES SERIES, PART 6
The North Korean
Nuclear Program: Technical and Policy Issues
Yo-Taik Song
Washington, DC
US Department of Energy and Department of
State (Retired)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Yo-Taik Song received his doctorate in Nuclear
Engineering in 1968 from the University of Illinois - Urbana.
From 1979 to 1997, he worked at the Department of Energy
as a staff scientist and at the Department of State as
a Technical Adviser. While at the State Department,
his primary work was negotiations and implementation of
the US-North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994 including
Light Water Reactor project, and traveled extensively
to various North Korean power generating stations and
nuclear reactor sites.
The North Korean
Nuclear Program: Technical and Policy Issues
Based in part on papers presented
in the Spring of 2003 at MIT and Princeton by Dr. Yo-Taik Song and
Robert Alvarez. Mr. Alvarez is a Senior
Scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Between
1993 and 1999, Mr. Alvarez served as a Senior
Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for National Security,
Environmental Safety and Health, and Labor. Prior
to joining the DOE, Mr. Alvarez served for five years
(1988-93) as Senior Professional Staff for the
U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Chaired by
Senator John Glenn. He is a national award-winning
author and has published several articles in prominent
publications including Science Magazine, the Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists, The Nation Technology Review, and
the Washington Post.
Part I. Technical Issues
1. History of North Korea's Nuclear Program
(Up until 1994)
1954
North Korean scientists and engineers begin nuclear training at the Devuna
Institute in the USSR.
( South Korea sends it’s scientists
and engineers to Harwell, UK and Argonne National Laboratory, USA.)
1962 Nuclear
Research Center in Yongbyon is established.
1965 A small
sub critical assembly at Yongbyon, purchased from the USSR in 1963, becomes
operational.
1970s Uranium Mine
and Purification plant at Pyung San, North Province of Hwahng Hae Province.
A Uranium Purification Plant at
Bak Chon is developed. North Korea is estimated to have a high grade
uranium deposit of about 26 million
tons.
1985 DPRK signs
an agreement on “Technical Economic Cooperation between DPRK-USSR.”
1985 Negotiations
conclude an agreement for purchasing LWR nuclear power plants from USSR for
2000
Megawatts.
1985 to 1992
Construction of the Radiochemistry Laboratory at Yongbyon begins, and
by 1992 is mostly
completed. The lab is for reprocessing
of spent fuel.
1986 to 1990
Operation of 5 MW Graphite Moderated Reactor (GMR) at Yongbyon begins in
1986.
Construction starts on the 50 MW
GMR in Yongbyun, followed by the 200 MW GMR at Taechon in 1990.
1994 The Agreed Framework
with the US freezes the DPRK nuclear program, in exchange for fuel oil,
providing light water nuclear reactors
and canning of the spent fuel stored from the 5 MW reactor in storage
pool.
2. Characteristics of the North Korean Graphite
Moderated Reactor
– Natural
Uranium can be used as a fuel.
– Over all
fuel burn up is limited and low.
– Build up
of Pu-240 in the burn up fuel is low.
– Slowing
down power is low.
– Large volume
ratio of moderator to fuel.
– Low power
density and large core volume.
– Low probability
for the reactivity accident.
– Longer
Migration Length.
– Neutronically
more tightly coupled than LWR.
– Significant
thermal neutron captures in large mass of graphite
– Low atom
densities of gases are needed for the coolant.
3. Characteristics of the French and British
Graphite Moderated Reactors
– Fuel rod:
Uranium metal to minimize the parasitic thermal neutron captures.
– Efficiency
is low.
– Large size
of the core, permissible pressure of the primary coolant is limited.
– Metallurgy
of the uranium metal with Magnox cladding severely limits the coolant
temperature at which
system can
be operated.
– Stored
Energy in the Graphite;( the Wigner Energy); the stored energy in lattice
defects are formed by
neutron bombardment
at temperature below 300 degree in C.
– If the
temperature is elevated, these effects anneal out in exothermic processes
that may become autocatalytic
if the defect
density is great enough.
4. The North Korean Reactor Design
• The North Korean
reactors are based on a design first used by Britain in 1956 (Calder Hall).
• The reactor
is fueled with natural uranium metal – clad with a magnesium alloy (magnox).
It has a graphite
moderator and
uses pressurized CO-2 as the coolant.
5. Yongbyon 5 MW Graphite Moderated
Reactor
• Initial
operation began in 1986, with frequent fuel element failures (~ 5 to 10%)
and extended outages of more
than 100 days
during operation.
Characteristics:
-- Rated
thermal power: 20 to 30 MW
-- Electrical
out put: 2 to 5 MWe
-- Moderator:
Graphite
-- Coolant:
CO-2 Gas
-- Fuel
cladding material: MgO2 with Zr (easily eroded by moisture)
-- Fuel:
Natural uranium metal.
Diameter:
3 CM
Length:
40 CM
Weight:
6.2 kg.
• Reactor
Core:
-- It has 812 vertically loaded fuel channels with about 7,700
fuel rods in the core.
-- Total fuel load is about 48 metric tons; 9 rods per
channel (some have 10 rods.)
• May 1994,
DPRK announced shutdown to refuel the entire core and discharged all of the
reactor’s spent fuel.
6. General Characteristics of the
fuel rods
•
To retard the corrosion, the pH of the pool was kept high, at 11.5; however,
pin hole pitting increases with
high
pH.
•
If the fuel cladding is significantly compromised, fission products in the
fuel can be dissolved in to the pool
water
and contaminate the pool to hazardous radiation levels.
•
Uranium exposed to water generates hydrides and can easily ignite in the
presence of oxygen.
•
Decay heat is about 0.7 watt per freshly discharged fuel rod-- irradiated
in a reactor. A fuel rod of 6.2 kg
could
reach about 10 degree C, and the temperature of the pool water could be higher
than outside of the
pool
environment.
7. Spent Fuel Storage at the 5
MW Reactor
• The
Reactor Spent Fuel Pool is 6 by 15 meters with a depth of about 6 meters.
Pool water is maintained
at
a high pH (11.5).
• It
is linked to the reactor building through a tunnel filled with water.
• Due
to a seasonally warm environmental temperature and sunlight, a large amount
of ALGAE was formed
and
present and made the water a dark green emulsion.
• Erosion
of the fuel cladding formed an opaque colloidal suspension of magnesium oxide
in the pool.
• About
six fuel rods were placed in a basket, and two or three layers of baskets
were stacked in the pool.
• A layer
of sludge of magnesium oxide is at the bottom of the pool.
• Dry
storage: Damaged fuel element (700) were stored in a dry pit adjacent to
the reactor building.
8. Reprocessing Plant (“Radiochemical
Laboratory”) in Yongbyon
• The
reprocessing building is 180 meters long and 6 stories high.
• The
facility was in the early stages of initial startup when it’s activities
were frozen in 1994. It can probably
handle
Magnox fuel of 400 MWtD/ton burn up and has an estimated capacity to process
about 160 tons
of
spent fuel per year (assuming all three GMR reactors are in full operation).
• Depending
on the plants’ efficiency, about 50 to 150 kilograms of plutonium might be
separated annually.
• The
operation is based on the PUREX system developed by the US in the 1950’s.
It consists of mechanical
chopping
of the fuel elements, dissolution of spent fuel in nitric acid. The dissolved
fuel is then treated with a
mixture
of tributyl phosphate and kerosene in several complex steps to extract and
purify plutonium and
uranium.
• The
Waste Storage Building adjacent to the Radiochemical Lab contains high level
radioactive wastes stored
in
tanks. The building is two stories high and 160 ft long. It is about 150
ft away from the Radiochemical Lab.
• The
facility probably has hot cells provided by the USSR, which may have been
used to perform “small
batch”
plutonium extraction.
Part II. The 1994 U.S./DPRK Agreed
Framework
1. Events Leading to the US/DPRK Agreed
Framework
• In 1985,
the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a member state under
the
Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and agrees to inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency
(IAEA).
• In 1986
the DPRK starts up a reactor (5 MW GMR) suitable for producing weapons-grade
plutonium.
• The DPRK submits
“Special Nuclear Materials” accounting and Facility Reports to the IAEA (
~5 years
after the official
deadline) and enters in a full-scope safeguard agreement, on April 10, 1992.
• IAEA conducts
six ad hoc inspections between June 1992 and February 1993 -- revealing
a plutonium
reprocessing
capability. In late 1992, IAEA finds evidence that North Korea
reprocessed more than the
80 grams officially
disclosed.
• In 1993
DPRK refuses an IAEA request for a special inspection of the Radiation Chemistry
Laboratory and
waste storage
facility, and announces its intention to withdraw from NPT. This leads to
to UN Security
Council resolution.
• In 1994,
the DPRK announces that it will discharge the entire core of the 5 Mw GMR.
The IAEA requests
a halt to the operation
to inspect the core, which the DPRK rejects and then expedites the spent
fuel
unloading operation.
• In June 1994,
Kim Il Sung agrees to freeze DPRK’s plutonium program to facilitate bi-lateral
negotiations with
the US, after meeting
with former President Jimmy Carter.
• An Agreed Framework
between the U.S. and the DPRK is signed on October 21,1994.
2. The U.S./DPRK Agreed Framework
• Both sides will
cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors with light-water
reactor (LWR)
power plants producing
2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
• The U.S. will
organize and lead an international consortium [ the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development
Organization – KEDO]
to finance and supply the LWR project.
• The U.S. will
initially provide 500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) annually for heating
and electricity
production, which
KEDO will later assume responsibility. The Heavy Fuel Oil will offset energy
losses due to
the freeze of the
DPRK's graphite-moderated reactor program, pending completion of the first
LWR unit.
• The DPRK will freeze
all the graphite-moderated reactor projects, related facilities, and will
eventually
dismantle these facilities.
-- Throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will
monitor the DPRK reactors
and reprocessing facilities with the full cooperation of the DPRK.
--
Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities
will be completed when
the LWR project is completed.
-- The U.S. and DPRK will cooperate to find a method to store safely the
spent fuel from the 5 MW(e)
reactor during the construction of the LWR project (canning the fuel).
When adequate construction is reached,
the spent fuel will be disposed outside of the country without reprocessing
in the DPRK.
3. Securing Spent Fuel at Yongbyon
•
In January 1995 US and the DPRK agree on specifics of placing spent reactor
fuel from the 5 MW reactor
into canisters (Canning of the spent fuel) for IAEA inspection and surveillance.
--
The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) provides the technical and financial support,
and project management.
-- DPRK provides labor and technical resources.
•
Canning operation starts in April 1996 and is completed in October 1997.
•
Total cost of project is $20 million.
At the time of canning operation, there are 7,700 fuel rods in a storage
pool, and 700 damaged rods in a dry
storage pit.
--
Each individual rod is brushed with clean water, rinsed, dried, and placed
in a stainless steel tube.
-- Inert gas is then injected into the stainless steel tube and sealed
without a gasket.
-- Tubes are bundled and placed in the storage pool, tagged and secured.
4. Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments
•
Approximately 3.5 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) (annual rates of 500,000
tons) has been delivered by
November of 2002. KEDO has not been able to meet routine schedules
in providing fuel oil.
•
Costs to provide heavy fuel oil are approximately $50 to $60 million per
year, depending on oil prices.
•
Difficulties Encountered:
-- Because of the HFO price fluctuations, a short fall in funding is likely
almost every year.
-- Sunbong harbor (the original destination where a HFO power plant is located)
is too shallow, so the HFO
has to be pumped directly to onshore storage from the tanker.
-- Use of the HFO for civilian purposes is not completely assured. HFO is
measured with flow meters installed
by the US at various sites where oil is used.
--
Seasonal fluctuation of electric demands makes it impossible to consume all
the HFO supplied from the
eastern port of Sunbong.
--Western
coast power plants use coals as a main source of fuel, and only recently
have been able to use
heavy fuel oil.
5. The Agreed Framework and Light Water Reactors
(LWR)
•
Basis for LWR agreement stems from a meeting with former President, Jimmy
Carter and Kim Il Sung in
1994, Kim requests that US supply LWRs to replace 2000 MW which North
Korea planned to import
from Russia.
•
In December, 1995 KEDO and the DPRK enter into a the Light Water Reactor
Supply Agreement.
The parties settle on the indigenous Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant
(KSNP) under construction at
Uljin, South Korea as a reference plant.
•
Costs for the two LWR units are now estimated at $5 billion. South Korea
and Japan are to contribute
$3.22 Billion and $1 Billion respectively. EU is to contribute $76 million.
• 1997
- Ground breaking begins at the Kumho site (Eastern coast of N. Korea). Kumho
is chosen because
an extensive site survey was made earlier by the Russians, at a time when
DPRK had agreed to purchase
LWR’s from the USSR. Site preparation costs are about $45 Million.
•
In 1999 the contract between KEDO and the Korean Electric Power Corporation
(KEPO) is signed,
with a total cost of $4.086 Billion.
•
In December 1999 Site Preparation is completed, and construction of
the reactor begins.
•
Of 13 reactor supply protocols signed, four more protocols remain to be completed
(turn over date,
repayment, spent fuel and safety/security).
•
North Korea insists, with no success, that KEDO finances modernization of
its electrical grid – a significant
portion built by the Japanese in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Estimated cost is
about $750 million.
•
In August, 2002 concrete pouring operation for the reactor begins.
•
In November 2002, 26% of the project is accomplished ( design, procurement
and initiation of construction).
•
In December 2002 there are a total of 1,376 people at the construction site.
Part III. Policy Issues
1. The Cold War and Korea
•
In 1945, the U.S. drops atomic bombs on Japan. The US and USSR divide Korea
in half at the 38th parallel,
initially to disarm the Japanese military.
•
In 1949 the Soviet Union detonates its first atomic bomb. The US and the
Soviet Union embark on a major
nuclear arms race.
• In
1950 the Korean War starts when Communist forces of the north attack South
Korea. General Douglas
MacArthur urges the use of nuclear and radiological weapons, and to invade
China. President Truman declines
and replaces MacArthur.
• In
1953, the U.S., (South Korea) and Communist leaders agree to an armistice.
A boundary near the original
dividing
line of 38th parallel with a demilitarized zone dividing the north and south
is established. The US maintains
a
permanent US military presence (now at a troop level of 37,000).
•
In 1954, President Eisenhower initiates the “Atoms for Peace” program. That
same year Eisenhower initiates
the “New Look” military policy – placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons;
and Secretary of State Dulles
outlines the doctrine of “massive retaliation.”
•
In 1964, China tests its first successful fission device.
•
In the late 1950’s, the US deploys tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea,
eventually reaching about 950
warheads by 1967.
•
In 1991, the US withdraws its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.
The ROK and DPRK join the
UN; and announced the “Denuclearization Declaration of the Korean Peninsula.”
2. Events leading to the Current Crisis
•
U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary Kelley confronts the DPRK in October
2002 at the first official
meeting between the Bush Administration and North Korea with evidence
regarding efforts to enrich uranium
using gas centrifuge technology.
•
North Korean efforts to enrich uranium with Pakistani assistance were known
within the U.S. government
and was on the public record for several years.
“There is significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons activity continues,
including efforts to acquire
uranium enrichment technologies. Since 1994, North Korea has sought
external assistance for its nuclear
program. It has sold missile production equipment to Pakistan…” ( North
Korea Advisory Group, Report
to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, November 1999.)
•
Kelly delivers an ultimatum demanding that North Korea end its uranium enrichment
program or otherwise
forego further cooperation under the Agreed Framework.
•
North Korea responds by asserting its right to defend itself with nuclear
weapons and insists on a non-
aggression pact with the US.
•
In December 2002, the US suspends heavy oil shipments. North Korea expels
IAEA inspectors, announces
intentions to restart its nuclear program and to withdraw from the NPT.
•
The I.A.E.A. passed a resolution in February 2003 that formally recognized
that North Korea's actions
represents a major security threat.
3. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons
•
Estimates of separated plutonium: 12-14 kilograms (CIA/DIA), 8-9 kilograms
(David Albright); 16-24
kilograms (Japan); and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea).
•
Potential plutonium production capability: As much as 20 to 30 kg of plutonium
may be in the 5 MW
discharged reactor core. The two larger Gas Moderated Reactors (GMR),
if completed, could produce
about 275 Kgs of plutonium a year (operating at full capacity)
4. North Korea’s Demand for a Non Aggression
Pact with the US
•
Fear and animus created by the US fire power, during the Korean War, remain
powerful elements in North
Korea’s view towards the US; and has had a strong impact on North
Korean military policy. About 4 million
Korean causalities are estimated from the war, of which 3 million were North
Koreans.
• North
Korean leaders believe that only a written assurance of non aggression by
the US can relax tensions
and resolve what remains one of the last dangerous vestiges of the Cold War.
5. Bush Administration Policy
•
Iraq remains the highest priority. The Bush Administration does not want
two major simultaneous military
crises and asserts that the North Korea nuclear situation is not a crisis.
•
Diplomacy rather than military options are preferred and are expected to
continue. Although, the Bush
Administration states it does not intend to conduct military actions
and warns of economic sanctions, it has
increased US military presence.
•
Administration officials have stated that Agreed Framework will be terminated,
and has used its leadership
of KEDO to cease heavy oil shipments. The next decision will
be over suspension of the Light Water
Reactor program.
•
The Bush administration effectively abandoned the Clinton policy of engagement
and appears engaged in an
isolation policy; will not talk directly with North Korea about mutual security
agreements or economic aid
until the North begins dismantling its weapons program. Pyongyang has rejected
those terms.
•
The US seeks the formation of international coalition to pressure DPRK to
end its nuclear program.
6. Conclusion
•
The North Korean crisis was prompted by a confrontation between the US and
the DPRK, based on
information on the public record for several years, regarding North Korea’s
efforts to develop uranium
enrichment technology. There are technical obstacles that make uranium enrichment
much less of a threat than
the DPRK’s plutonium production capability.
• The
Bush Administration has abandoned the Clinton policy of engagement and has
adopted a policy of isolation.
The administration is taking steps to terminate the Agreed Framework. North
Korea is raising the stakes by
stating its intention of withdrawing from the NPT and threatening to return
to its plutonium based nuclear
weapons program.
• The Agreed
Framework opened the door for rapprochement between the Koreas and Japan.
As the key
provider of light water reactors, South Korea has a major stake in the 1994
Agreed Framework – particularly
with respect to rebuilding the North Korean energy and manufacturing sectors.
Current efforts to terminate this
agreement
may be adding to anti US sentiment in South Korea.
• DPRK’s efforts
to produce and separate plutonium stopped for more than eight years, but
now may resume
sometime
between the next several months to a year. This could also allow North
Korea to sell plutonium in
exchange
for currency, and technology.
• The nuclear
non proliferation regime in East Asia and other parts of the world, threatens
to further unravel.
7. What to do in the near term?
• The Agreed Framework
should not be terminated. It has key elements which if activated, can defuse
this crisis
through bilateral
negotiations to resolve problems. They include provisions, which:
-- assures that
the United States will take no military actions or economic sanctions against
the DPRK during
negotiations
on outstanding problems.
-- freezes the DPRK’s
plutonium production program and allows for IAEA inspections of the plutonium
program
during bilateral negotiations with the US.
-- can allow the
DPRK’s uranium enrichment activities to fall under full scope IAEA safeguards.
• Cultural and economic
exchange Initiatives between the Koreas, and Japan should be encouraged to
continue.
The Agreed
Framework opened the door for rapprochement between the Koreas and Japan
– the first vital
steps towards
to a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Agreement in East Asia.
8. What to do in the long term?
• A formal, comprehensive
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Agreement should be established in East Asia. The
agreement
would be based on:
-- Compliance by nuclear
weapons states with Article VI of the NPT in achieving meaningful nuclear
disarmament
-- a verifiable
pledge by the US, Russia, and China, to not to deploy or use nuclear weapons
in East Asia; and
-- a verifiable pledge
that North and South Korea and Japan would refrain from nuclear weapons development.
9. Nuclear Powers in East Asia
The South Korean Nuclear Program
• Currently, about 30% of South Korea’s
domestic electric need is generated by nuclear power.
• South Korea has 18 nuclear power plants.
Four are Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors provided by Canada
and the remainder are PWR’s.
• South Korea has an advanced nuclear
power program, second only to Japan in the far east. South Korea’s nuclear
power program was initially based
on the US and French PWR designs, but now has its own indigenous capabilities
including design and manufacture,
construction, training and operations. The Korean Standard Nuclear Plant
(KSNP) is now established.
• South Korea has a growing spent reactor
fuel problem as others and is looking for an indigenous waste
management program.
• South Korea abandoned its nuclear
weapons program in the 1975, but has an active ballistic missile program
and
may have the technical capabilities
to produce nuclear weapons.
• South Korea is a signatory to several
nonproliferation treaties and has adopted a policy of a “nuclear free” Korean
peninsula.
China’s Nuclear Program
• China has three operating nuclear
power plants provided by the French. Four units are under construction.
• Unlike Japan, North Korea and
South Korea, China is not self sufficient in reactor design and construction.
• One indigenous plant is being developed,
but China still relies on France and Japan for key components.
• China's known uranium resources appear
to be sufficient though the country has adopted the goal of a “closed”
nuclear fuel cycle.
• China began developing nuclear weapons
in the late 1950s with major Soviet assistance, and by 1964 tested its
first fission device.
• China’s nuclear stockpile is uncertain.
Estimates suggest China has about 400 nuclear weapons for ballistic missiles,
bombers, artillery projectiles and
landmines. Currently, China is developing ballistic missiles to have
MIRV systems.
Japan’s Nuclear Program
• Japan has a highly advanced indigenous
nuclear program consisting of 51 plants (28 BWRs, 23 PWRs) totaling
more than 44 GWe capacity.
• Japan's nuclear power program supplies
over 35 percent of the nation's electricity demand – making it the third
largest nuclear program in the world
behind the US and France.
• Japan is committed to the complete
nuclear fuel cycle -- uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, irradiation,
reprocessing, and waste disposal.
Unlike the U.S., Japan includes plutonium utilization and uranium recycling
in its
nuclear program as a matter of national
policy.
• Japanese military capabilities, particularly
ballistic missiles and naval forces are extensive and well advanced.
• Japan has about 37.4 metric tons of
separated plutonium. About 5.3 tons are held in Japan and the remainder
are
stored at reprocessing plants
in France (La Hague) and England (Sellafield). (Source: IAEA, INFCRIRC/549,
December 10, 2001)
• Japan has the potential to develop
a large number of advanced nuclear weapons.
End