CHINA'S LITTLE KOREA SECRET
    Commentary, The Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2003
    http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-chae25feb25,1,5958327.story
    By Haesook Chae

    Dr. Haesook Chae
    Assistant Professor
    Department of Political Science
    Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio
    hchae@bw.edu

     

 
    Why won't China rein in North Korea in the current nuclear crisis? The answer lies in Beijing's secret goal of getting
    U.S. troops off the peninsula.

    The prevailing understanding on China is fundamentally flawed.  The consensus is that China shares common interests
    with the U.S. and nations in the region in denuclearizing North Korea.  Therefore, it ought to play an active and leading
    role in resolving the crisis, especially because Beijing seems to have the most leverage over North Korea.

    Much to the disappointment of the U.S., however, China has excused itself from the "relevant parties." Beijing insists
    that this is really a matter exclusively between the United States and North Korea. Furthermore, China does not
    believe that the U.S.- North Korean dialogue ought to include the United Nations; Beijing has vociferously opposed
    efforts to bring in the world body to bear on the issue. The question is, why?

    The key to understanding China's behavior is realizing that exclusively bilateral talks could produce what China secretly
    craves: the removal of the U.S. military presence from the Korean peninsula.

    In a multilateral setting, the emphasis would be on North Korea's violation of the international Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty and its threat to the region and the world. Thus, various multinational measures to disarm North Korea would be
    discussed. U.N. involvement would remove the onus on the U.S.  to negotiate on its own.

    However, if the situation were framed solely as a dispute between the U.S. and North Korea, the focus would be
    shifted to  what North Korea is demanding in exchange for nuclear disarmament. North Korea, with its far-reaching
    missile  capability, would then be perceived as a direct threat to U.S. security. Combined with South Korea's strong
    resistance to taking military action against the North, the U.S. could well  be cornered into conceding to North
    Korean demands, namely, a  nonaggression treaty and a military withdrawal from South  Korea. China would then
    have achieved its short-term goal of  removing U.S. troops from the peninsula.

    Ejection of the U.S. military presence is an essential first step toward China's ultimate long-term goals: reunification
    with Taiwan and reassertion as the dominant regional power. After a U.S. withdrawal, China would be likely to find
    two  friendly Koreas on its southern border. Post-Cold War South  Korea is no longer a hostile country but an
    important trading  partner. And if a united Korea emerges, it would probably be  amicable toward China.
    Further, if Japan rearms and goes nuclear in reaction to the  new circumstances on the Korean peninsula, the rationale
    for  the U.S. military presence there may be diminished as well.

    In this best-case scenario for China, with American forces removed from Korea and Japan, Far East geopolitics would
    enter a new era. China could reassert its historical status as the dominant regional power and eventually reabsorb
    Taiwan. This crisis may well drive the U.S. off the Korean peninsula.

    With this in mind, why should China help the U.S. to maintain  its military presence in South Korea by pressuring
    North  Korea to give up nuclear weapons?  That China appears constrained by anxieties over the potential  flood of
    starving refugees that would be created by North  Korea's economic collapse only serves as a cover for China to
    prop up North Korea's bargaining position. China's sales of a  key chemical ingredient for nuclear weapons
    development to North Korea, as recently as December, should be understood  within this context. China wants
    North Korea to maintain its strong leverage in any bilateral talks with the U.S.

    Only when viewed from this perspective are China's inaction and stubborn insistence on direct talks between
    Pyongyang and Washington comprehensible; indeed, it is a profound and brilliant strategy.